Public Interest Law Reporter
Volume 16
Issue 2 Spring 2011

Article 19

2011

It's More Than Ramps: Housing Accessibility for
People with Disabilities
Kim Borowicz
Hillary Coustan

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Disability Law Commons, and the
Housing Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kim Borowicz, & Hillary Coustan, It's More Than Ramps: Housing Accessibility for People with Disabilities, 16 Pub. Interest L. Rptr. 183
(2011).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/19

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public Interest Law Reporter by an
authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Borowicz and Coustan: It's More Than Ramps: Housing Accessibility for People with Disab

No. 2 • Spring 2011

CHICAGO
PUBLIC HOUSING SPECIAL
IT’S MORE THAN RAMPS:
HOUSING ACCESSIBILITY FOR
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
by KIM BOROWICZ

AND

HILLARY COUSTAN

INTRODUCTION

W

hen many people think about “accessibility,” they think of ramps, automatic doors, and parking spaces. For people with cognitive and
mental health disabilities1, however, accessibility is more than physical structures. Indeed, many people with these types of disabilities have been excluded
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from schools, recreation, and housing opportunities as a result of programmatic barriers to accessibility, such as excessive paperwork requirements, inflexible deadlines, and a general lack of support in navigating complicated
bureaucracies. This article explores the role these barriers play within the context of the federal Housing Choice Voucher Program, in particular, and considers potential remedies under statutes designed to combat discrimination
against people with disabilities.
MOVING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
THE COMMUNITY

FROM

SEGREGATED SETTINGS

INTO

The U.S. Supreme Court held in 1999 that people with disabilities have the
right, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), to live in the community, rather than be warehoused in institutions and nursing homes.2 Yet, for
many, affordable housing remains elusive.
The federal government implemented Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
which is designed to provide stipends to people with disabilities and older
adults for living expenses. However, SSI pays only $674 per month to those
who qualify.3 With such low income, a person on SSI has limited housing
options. As outlined in a 2010 report by the National Council on Disability:

No State in the United States has an average-priced one-bedroom or studio
apartment that would be affordable to someone on SSI. In fact, the average
rental payment in the United States for a studio would require spending 100
percent of the monthly SSI payment and renting the average one-bedroom
unit would require 112 percent of a monthly SSI payment. As a result, most
of the 4.2 million people receiving SSI cannot afford housing in their communities unless they receive some form of housing subsidy.4

Vouchers provide people with disabilities with a housing subsidy that allows
them to live in a regular apartment—and significantly, also allows them to
receive services in their own home, rather than in nursing homes.5 The Section
8 Voucher program (now called the Housing Choice Voucher Program) was
created in 1974 and is administered by local and State public housing authorities.6 Tenants make partial rental payments, usually one-third of their income,
and the public housing authority (PHA) pays the remainder.7
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The voucher holder can rent any apartment as long as it is approved by the
public housing authority and the size and rent is within the limit set by the
voucher.8 The voucher holder signs a lease with the landlord, and is therefore
responsible for both lease-compliance and compliance with the voucher rules.9
The termination of a voucher is arguably more detrimental to a voucher holder
than eviction because a voucher holder’s low income makes it nearly impossible for him or her to find substitute housing.
The voucher program contrasts sharply with other forms of state-funded housing provided to people with cognitive and mental health disabilities, such as
group homes, permanent supportive housing, institutions, hospitals, and nursing homes. These types of housing, with the exception of some forms of permanent supportive housing, are congregate settings that condition housing on
accepting services, do not allow residents to live with their family or roommates of choice, do not provide residents with a choice of where to live, and
segregate people with disabilities.10 State mental health and developmental disability agencies provide housing focused on services rather than choice.11 A
residence is simply not a home when it is a place where services are required.
Unlike these programs, a person with a voucher who may need services, such
as counseling, medication management, and case management, can receive
them through a Home and Community Based Services Waiver.12
BARRIERS

TO

ACCESSING

THE

HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM

As we move from institutional placements to a more integrated model, the
importance of the voucher program cannot be understated. Yet, the very program that facilitates this transition is failing to adequately serve people with
disabilities.13 People with specifically cognitive and mental health disabilities
face many barriers in the voucher program. Such individuals experience potential roadblocks at a number of different stages of the program, such as:
1) During the application process
2) In the waiting list and lottery process
3) During certification and annual recertification to qualify for the program
4) When responding to notices regarding their vouchers
5) When moving to another unit
6) When requesting a reasonable accommodation
7) When participating in an informal hearing
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8) During the process of termination from the program.14

The barriers that can arise include excessive documentation requirements, confusing and complex rules and procedures, and inflexible deadlines.15 In addition, people with disabilities must sometimes make repeated requests for
accommodations and provide a signed statement from a medical professional
before an accommodation will be considered.16 People with cognitive and
mental health disabilities often become overwhelmed by the bureaucracy of the
voucher program, which can cost them their vouchers. These barriers persist
despite the federal requirement that housing authorities “affirmatively further
fair housing.”17
LEGAL REMEDIES

FOR

DISCRIMINATION

IN THE

VOUCHER PROGRAM

Given these barriers to participation in the voucher program, what legal remedies does a person with a cognitive or mental health disability have at his or her
disposal? Three statutes protect people with disabilities from discrimination in
this context. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits discrimination against
people with disabilities by housing providers, including public housing authorities. Title II of the ADA deals specifically with discrimination by “public entities” such as state and local governments,18 while Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (Section 504) covers any program receiving federal financial
assistance or conducted by any Executive agency.19
Because the voucher program is funded and operated by local public housing
authorities in tandem with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), a claim of programmatic discrimination relating to the
voucher program could arguably be brought under the ADA or Section 504;
an individual claim can be made under the FHA as well.20
The challenge, then, becomes defining the contours of such a claim. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title II of the ADA or Section
504, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) He or she has a disability within the meaning of the statutes;
(2) He or she is “otherwise qualified”; and
(3) He or she was excluded from, denied the benefit of, or subject to discrimination under a program or activity carried out by a public entity under
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the ADA, or by a federal executive agency or recipient of federal funds under
Section 504.21

A plaintiff must make similar showings under the FHA.22 However, the FHA
does not require a plaintiff to prove he or she is “otherwise qualified,” as required by the ADA and Section 504.23 After a plaintiff has established a prima
facie case of discrimination, he or she may then propose reasonable modifications to the program to bring it into compliance with these laws; the burden
then shifts to the defendant to implement those modifications, unless it can
demonstrate that they would constitute a fundamental alteration of the policy
or program at issue
Each of these elements requires some elucidation.
Defining “Disability”
The ADA, Section 504, and the FHA do not single out specific cognitive or
mental health disabilities, such as autism or schizophrenia, for protection
against discrimination. Rather, these laws take an individualized approach to
the definition of who has a disability. To that end, these laws define disability
in generalized terms: a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities.24
Under the ADA, as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA), major life activities include, but are not limited to, taking care of
oneself, sleeping, speaking, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working; further, functions of the brain are also included as a
major bodily function that qualifies as a major life activity.25 Significantly, the
ADAAA provides that the definition of disability “shall be construed in favor
of broad coverage of individuals” to the maximum extent permitted by the
statute.26
With this definition in mind, and Congress’ admonition to construe coverage
broadly, it seems likely that myriad cognitive and mental health disabilities
would qualify as “disabilities” under the ADA, Section 504, and the FHA.
Indeed, the recently finalized Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) regulations for the ADAAA state that autism, intellectual disability,
major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
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schizophrenia all constitute impairments that presumptively substantially limit
the major life activity of brain function.27
Even absent the EEOC regulations, however, numerous major life activities
besides brain function may be implicated by these disabilities. For example,
autism spectrum disorders, Down’s syndrome, and learning disabilities, depending on their severity, could substantially limit one’s ability to take care of
him or herself, learn, read, concentrate, think, communicate or work. Similarly, bipolar disorder, depression, and schizophrenia could be framed as substantially limiting the major life activities of sleeping, concentrating,
communicating, and working, depending on the facts of an individual case.
“Otherwise Qualified”
Assuming that a plaintiff with one of the cognitive or mental health disabilities
described above has standing to bring a claim against a public housing authority (under the ADA and Section 504), the next issue becomes whether he or
she is a “qualified individual with a disability.” A “qualified individual with a
disability” is defined by Title II as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal or architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and
services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services
or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.28

At first blush, it would seem that the eligibility criteria enumerated by HUD
— income, familial status, citizenship, and criminal history — should suffice
to prove eligibility for the voucher program.29 As explained above, however,
numerous barriers within the voucher program render people with cognitive or
mental health disabilities ineligible for benefits in the first instance, or subject
to termination once in the program. Such barriers are arguably better framed
as part of the discrimination/reasonable accommodation inquiry. “Many of the
issues that arise in the ‘qualified’ analysis, also arise in the context of the ‘reasonable modifications’ or ‘undue burden’ analysis.”30 The Supreme Court has
described this as “two sides of a single coin.”31
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Exclusion from Participation or Denial of Benefits
The third requirement — that the plaintiff be excluded from participation or
denied benefits in order to state a claim of discrimination — is typically the
most contentious element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case. Although it is widely
understood that one of the primary goals of Title II and Section 504 is to
enhance access to public programs and services, universal definitions of “participation” and “denial of benefits” remain elusive. Instead, as explained below,
in each case a court must undertake a fact-intensive inquiry to determine
whether a plaintiff has been denied meaningful access by the public entity in
question.
In Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court set forth a rubric for analyzing
Section 504 claims of the sort contemplated herein.32 In that case, a class of
Medicaid recipients alleged that Tennessee’s proposal to reduce the number of
inpatient hospital days that state Medicaid would pay on behalf of Medicaid
recipients violated Section 504.33 According to the plaintiffs, the proposed reduction of inpatient coverage from 20 to 14 days, while neutral on its face,
disproportionately disadvantaged people with disabilities.34 The Supreme
Court disagreed, however.
In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination, the Court framed its Section
504 inquiry in terms of “meaningful access”: “[A]n otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that
the grantee offers.”35 Applying that standard, the Choate court found that the
proposed 14-day limitation did not deny the plaintiffs meaningful access to
Tennessee Medicaid services, or exclude them from those services.36 Among
other things, the Court noted that Tennessee’s program did not invoke criteria
that had a particularly exclusionary effect on people with disabilities, nor did
Tennessee deny coverage on the basis of any test, judgment, or trait that people
with disabilities were less capable of meeting or less likely to have.37
Significantly, the Choate court also rejected any suggestion that Tennessee was
obligated to offer more than 14 days of coverage to people with disabilities:
At base, such a suggestion must rest on the notion that that the benefit
provided through state Medicaid programs is the amorphous objective of
“adequate health care.” But Medicaid programs do not guarantee that each
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recipient will receive that level of health care precisely tailored to his or her
particular needs. Instead, the benefit provided through Medicaid is a particular package of health care services, such as 14 days of inpatient coverage. . ..
Section 504 does not require the State to alter this definition of the benefit
being offered simply to meet the reality that the handicapped have greater
medical needs.38

Subsequent courts have elaborated on the Choate analysis. In American Council
for the Blind v. Paulson, in which a class of plaintiffs alleged that the Treasury
Department violated Section 504 by failing to issue paper currency that was
readily distinguishable to people with visual impairments, the D.C. Circuit
cited a “general pattern” in the meaningful access cases:
Where the plaintiffs identify an obstacle that impedes their access to a government program or benefit, they likely have established that they lack meaningful access to the program or benefit. By contrast, where the plaintiffs seek
to expand the substantive scope of a program or benefit, they likely seek a
fundamental alteration to the existing program or benefit and have not been
denied meaningful access.39

Thus, the meaningful access cases fall along a continuum of sorts. At one end
are cases in which plaintiffs complain about barriers to participation that are
merely incidental to the program at issue; on the other end are cases in which
plaintiffs seek to change the nature of the benefit or program.40 In every case,
though, the parameters of the benefit or program in dispute are at the crux of
the court’s analysis.
Accordingly, for a prospective plaintiff seeking to challenge the voucher program as discriminatory, a threshold issue involves defining the scope of the
challenged benefit. In Liberty Resources, Inc. v. Philadelphia Housing Authority,
a disability advocacy group alleged that Philadelphia’s voucher program discriminated against people with physical disabilities in violation of Title II as
well as Section 504.41 The district court grappled with defining the scope of
the benefit and services at issue. In that case, the plaintiff argued that the
voucher program failed to provide enough accessible housing, and that it therefore denied people with physical disabilities meaningful access to the program
and its benefits.
The plaintiff in Liberty Resources urged the court to define the scope of the
benefit offered by the voucher program as providing affordable housing —
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and, by extension, argued that because people with physical disabilities were
being denied affordable housing, they were also being denied meaningful access to the voucher program. The court, however, refused to define the benefit
so broadly (or, in the words of the Choate court, so amorphously),42 instead
holding that the “benefits of the [voucher] program are a package of services
that provide assistance to voucher holders in locating affordable housing.”43
Among those services, the court held, were inspection of premises for compliance with quality standards, training for landlords, a service representative who
may be contacted for questions, weekly landlord briefings, a list of known
available units, monthly housing fairs, and various other services.44 Relying on
this narrower, more specific definition of the benefit at issue, the court in
Liberty Resources concluded that voucher holders with physical disabilities had
“successfully accessed” the variety of services offered by the voucher program
and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, a similar definition of the benefits of the
voucher program in the case of a plaintiff claiming discrimination arising from
the barriers facing people with cognitive and mental health disabilities, the
next question would be whether that plaintiff has been denied meaningful
access to those benefits.
As noted above, barriers such as excessive documentation requirements, inflexible deadlines, redundant paperwork requirements for reasonable accommodations, and a lack of support, collectively, impede access for people with
cognitive and mental health disabilities to numerous benefits of the voucher
program. Although the specifics of such a claim would need to be teased out in
substantial detail, it seems likely that a claim of this sort could be framed to
meet the test set forth in Choate and its progeny, i.e. that these barriers to
participation in the voucher program are incidental to the program and do not
seek to change the nature of the voucher program.
Reasonable Modifications/Fundamental Alteration
Whether and how these obstacles could be accommodated within the framework of the existing bureaucracy of public housing authorities’ voucher programs remain to be seen. The regulations provide limited guidance on how to
accommodate people with cognitive and mental health disabilities.45 Indeed,
“Although Congress intended the term reasonable accommodation to provide
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equality in all aspects of life for people with disabilities, it has been used primarily in the context of removing architectural barriers for people with physical
disabilities.”46
Nonetheless, some more general regulations can be interpreted as providing
such protections. For example, under Title II of the ADA, PHAs must provide
methods of “effective communication” to voucher holders who have disabilities.47 In addition, the Section 504 regulations describing housing adjustments
state that, “The [PHA] may not impose upon individuals with handicaps other
policies, . . . , that have the effect of limiting the participation of tenants with
handicaps in the [PHA’s] federally assisted housing program or activity in violation of this part.”48
Moreover, guidance issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development and the U.S. Department of Justice, two federal agencies that
enforce the FHA, states that an apartment building that has a policy of requiring renters to pay their rent in person must accommodate a tenant with a
mental health disability that makes her afraid to leave her unit by allowing a
friend to mail her rent check.49
Ideally, housing providers would offer voucher holders with cognitive and
mental health disabilities a support person to assist with navigating through
the voucher process.50 Extending deadlines is another reasonable accommodation.51 Other possible accommodations include providing note-takers at meetings or tape recording them, providing a scribe or reader to assist with written
documents, and streamlining the voucher process.52 The process for requesting
accommodations should also be centralized.
On the one hand, easing some of the administrative burdens and bureaucratic
red tape described above seems like a modest change that would improve access
for people with cognitive and mental health disabilities without substantively
altering the benefits provided by the voucher program. On the other hand, a
public housing authority could argue that the various requirements and deadlines are essential aspects of the voucher program, and that altering those protocols would be a fundamental alteration of the program.53 Needless to say,
the reasonable modification aspect of any hypothetical case would be a factspecific undertaking.
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CONCLUSION

Although much of the legal authority relating to accessibility focuses on ramps
and other physical accommodations, disability rights laws are more than
merely building codes. Abundant precedent and regulatory authority support
the provision of less obvious accommodations to less obvious disabilities.
Within the context of the Housing Choice Voucher Program, this would include reasonable accommodations that eliminate barriers to participation faced
by people with mental health and cognitive disabilities, such as unreasonable
deadlines and abundant paperwork.

NOTES
1 The terms cognitive and mental health disabilities are used by the authors to incorporate the
disabilities defined as “mental impairments” in the ADA, FHA, and Section 504.
2 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
3 SSI Social Security Administration, Federal Payment Amounts for 2011, available at http://
www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSI.html.
4 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE STATE OF HOUSING IN AMERICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A DISABILITY PERSPECTIVE 31 (2010).
5 24 C.F.R § 982.1.
6 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o). The initial legislation providing low-income housing assistance was
passed as section 8 of chapter 896 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, thus termed
“Section 8.” 24 C.F.R. 982.2; 24 C.F.R § 982.1(a)(1).
7 Id. § 982.1(a)(4)(ii).
8 Id. § 982.1(a)(2).
9 Id. § 982.1(b)(2).
10 See generally, Michael Allen, Separate and Unequal: The Struggle of Tenants with Mental
Illness to Maintain Housing at 3 (National Clearinghouse for Legal Services, Inc. 1996) (“ . . . as
long as MHAs [Mental Health Authorities] emphasize the administrative convenience of providing on-site mental health services, they will remain stuck on the group-home or congregateliving model, will not respond to consumer choice about housing, and will foster the kind of
dependency in residents that undermines the goal of independent living.”).
11 See generally, Paul J. Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness: Emerging
Approaches to Research and Practice, 44 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 439, 440 (1993)
(“Historically, mental health agencies have viewed housing as a social welfare problem and have
defined their role exclusively in terms of treatment. Public housing agencies, in turn, have contended that consumers need specialized residential programs and have viewed housing needs as a
responsibility of mental health agencies. Thus housing needs have often been ignored.”).
12 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (allows states to apply for a waiver of certain Medicaid requirements,
that would otherwise require people to live in nursing homes or institutions, in order to provide
long term care services in the community in their own home); Meghan K. Moore, Housing Issue:
Note: Piecing the Puzzle Together: Post-Olmstead Community-Based Alternatives for Homeless People
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with Severe Mental Illness, 16 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 249, 265-266 (2009) (Assertive
Community Treatment is a multi-disciplinary team of psychiatrists, nurses, social workers, and
other rehabilitation specialists that works together to provide case management, medication
management, counseling, assistance with shopping, cleaning, and other activities of daily living,
and help with social skills.).
13 See generally, Michael Allen, Increasing the Usability of Housing Choice Vouchers for People
with Disabilities, HOUSING LAW BULLETIN, available at http://bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=H7fNsTalv64%3d&tabid=245.
14 E-mail from Meghan Carter, Attorney & Equal Justice Works Fellow, Legal Assistance
Found. of Metro. Chi., to author (Feb. 16, 2011, 15:07 CST and March 11, 2011, 11:11 CST)
(on file with author).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)-(e); Exec. Order No. 12892 (Jan. 17, 1994), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/FHLaws/
EXO12892.
18 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
19 29 U.S.C. § 794.
20 A case of employment discrimination against a public housing authority, in contrast, could
be brought under Title I or Title II. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001).
21 Am. Council for the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For the most
part, claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are treated
identically. See, e.g., id.at 1260 n.2 (“[T]he courts have tended to construe Section 504 in
parimateria with Title II of the ADA” because the statutory provisions are similar in substance,
and cases interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003).
22 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f); Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109, 1134-1135 (D.C. 2005)
(“[I]n Giebeler v. M & B Associates, 343 F.3d at 1148-1150, 1156-1157; the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered both the burden of proof and the merits under ‘reasonable accommodation’ analysis applicable to the Fair Housing Act. The panel noted that courts
construing that Act have drawn on case law interpreting the same requirement under the federal
Rehabilitation Act (RA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The interpretive formulations under each, while conceivably differing in a way that could be outcome-determinative
in some instances, are not significantly different from one another.”); Giebeler v. M&B Assocs.,
343 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003) (To make out a claim of discrimination based on failure to
reasonably accommodate, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he has a disability as defined by
the FHAA; (2) defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the plaintiff’s disability;
(3) accommodation of the disability “may be necessary” to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity
to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants refused to make such accommodation.); Colon-Jimenez v. GR Mgmt. Corp., 218 Fed. Appx. 2, 3 (1st Cir. P.R. 2007) (“In order to make out
a prima facie case for failure to accommodate under the FHA, appellants bear the burden of
establishing three things: that the requested accommodation is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary
to (3) afford the handicapped person equal opportunity to use and enjoy the housing.”).
23 Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 820 N.E.2d 815, 823 (Mass. 2005) (“The
term ‘qualified’ handicapped person is not used in the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)
. . . However, it is used in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, to which [the FHA
is] analogous.”).
24 42 U.S.C.§ 12102(1)(A); 29 U.S.C. §705(20)(A)-(B); 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1).
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25 42 U.S.C.§ 12102(2)(A)-(B). The ADAAA also amends Section 504 by inserting “any
person who has a disability as defined in section 3 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (42 U.S.C. 12102)” in the definition section of 29 U.S.C. § 705(9).
26 42 U.S.C.§ 12102(4)(A). Congress added this provision, among others, in response to Supreme Court precedent that construed “substantially limits” and “major life activities” narrowly,
thus impeding plaintiffs’ ability to bring suit under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §12101 note
2(a)(4) (“the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999) and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be
afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.”).
27 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (“For example, applying the principles set forth in paragraphs
(j)(1)(i) through (ix) of this section, it should easily be concluded that the following types of
impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicated. . ..”).
28 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
29 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437f; 24 C.F.R. § 982.201; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND
URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER GUIDEBOOK 5-1, available at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/adm/hudclips/guidebooks/7420.10G/7420g05GUID.pdf.
30 Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 311 (Mass. 2005) (“ . . . many of the
issues that arise in the ‘qualified’ analysis, also arise in the context of the ‘reasonable modifications’ or ‘undue burden’ analysis. That is, if more than reasonable modifications are required of
an institution in order to accommodate an individual, then that individual is not qualified for
the program. In the public housing context, a ‘qualified’ handicapped individual is one who
could meet the authority’s eligibility requirements for occupancy and who could meet the conditions of a tenancy, with a reasonable accommodation or modification in the authority’s rules,
policies, practices, or services.”).
31 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 n. 19 (1985).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 290-91.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 301.
36 Id. at 302.
37 Id. at 302.
38 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. at 302.
39 Am. Council for the Blind, 525 F.3d at 1267 (emphasis added).
40 Id.; see also Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 653 (2d Cir. 1982).
41 528 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
42 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. at 302.
43 Id. at 568.
44 Id.; see also Taylor v. Hous. Auth. of New Haven, 267 F.R.D. 36, 58 (D.Conn. 2010)
(defining benefits of the HCV program as provision of a voucher, monthly assistance payments,
and, upon request, assistance in negotiating a reasonable rent).
45 See generally, 24 C.F.R. § 8.28, the Section 504 regulations for the Housing Choice
Voucher program, in which four of the six subsections focus on physical accessibility for those
with mobility disabilities. The FHA regulations pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) only provide two examples of reasonable accommodations: allowing service animals and reserved parking
spaces. The ADA Title I regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) provide that: “Reasonable
accommodation may include but is not limited to: (i) Making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (ii) Job restructuring;
part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modifi-
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cations of equipment or devices; appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies; the provision of qualified readers or interpreters; and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” Section 504 regulations regarding employment, 24 C.F.R. § 8.11(b), provide similar examples. ADA Title II regulation 23 C.F.R.
§ 35.104 states that “[q]ualified interpreters include, for example, sign language interpreters,
oral transliterators, and cued-language transliterators” and an example of tasks performed by
service animals includes “helping persons with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by
preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors,” but do not include, “the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship.” However, the FHA allows
for emotional support animals. U.S. v. Kenna Homes Coop. Corp., Civ. Action No. 2:04-0783
(S.D. W. Va. 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/housing/documents/kennasettle.
php; Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 43 (7th Cir. Wis. 1995).
46 Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One’s Own: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and
Housing Discrimination Against People with Mental Disabilities, 43 Am. U.L. Rev. 925, 951
(1994).
47 28 C.F.R. § 35.160.
48 24 C.F.R. § 8.33
49 Joint Statement, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev. and U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act, Washington, D.C. May 17, 2004, at pp. 1112 (Questions 5 & 6), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/library/huddojstatement.
pdf.
50 Vance v. Hous. Opportunities Comm’n, 332 F.Supp.2d 832, at 837, 843 (D. Md. 2004)
(Holding that the plaintiff, who had a mental health disability, had a Due Process right to be
provided guidance on how to contact a legal aid lawyer and allowing that lawyer to attend an
informal hearing regarding termination from a subsidized housing program. The court did not
decide on the plaintiff’s request for a non-attorney support person to assist him at the hearing.).
51 24 C.F.R. § 8.28(4) (“[PHAs] shall take into account the special problem of ability to
locate an accessible unit when considering requests by eligible individuals with handicaps for
extensions of Housing Certificates or Housing Vouchers.”); See generally Douglas v. Kriegsfeld
Corp. 884 A.2d 1109, 1127 (D. C. 2005) (landlord providing a voucher holder with extension
of time to comply with housekeeping requirements is a reasonable accommodation under the
FHA); McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2004) (extension of time to clean
yard reasonable accommodation under the ADA and FHA); Anast v. Commonwealth Apartments,
956 F. Supp. 792, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that an individual with a mental health disability should have been granted an extension of time before eviction proceedings should be initiated even after judgment of possession entered); but see Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc.,
437 Mass. 443, 455-456, 772 N.E.2d 1054 (2002) (indefinite requests for time extensions may
be deemed unreasonable).
52 28 C.F.R. § 35.160; 24 C.F.R. § 8.28(1) (“[PHAs] shall in providing notice of the availability and nature of housing assistance for low-income families under program requirements,
adopt suitable means to assure that the notice reaches eligible individuals with handicaps.”); 24
C.F.R. § 8.11(b)(2) & 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (reasonable accommodation may include
the provision of readers or interpreters and other similar actions); Technical Assistance Collaborative, Section 8 Made Simple, 2d ed. (2003) at 57, available at http://www.tacinc.org/
downloads/Sect8_2ndEd.pdf (“As a reasonable accommodation, people with disabilities can request changes in PHA recertification policies, such as: allowing more time for the recertification
process, including rescheduling appointments; providing home visits to conduct recertifications;
etc.”).
53 See generally Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. at 287
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